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Pushaw: Constitutionality of the New Deal

ANALYZING JUSTICE CARDOZO’S OPINIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW DEAL
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Cardozo’s appointment to the Supreme Court in
1932 capped a distinguished career as a lawyer, judge, and scholar.1
During his lengthy service on New York’s highest court, Cardozo
responded to industrialization and mass immigration – and the
resulting economic and social upheaval – by creatively adapting the
common law and by allowing legislatures wide latitude in tackling
novel problems.2 As Cardozo explained in his groundbreaking book
The Nature of the Judicial Process, judges must follow the legal
principles embedded in statutes and precedent, but that law continually
evolves to accommodate new circumstances and changing ideas about
social welfare and morality.3
When Cardozo became a Justice, it is no surprise that he
adopted a practical, case-by-case approach to reviewing New Deal
legislation, which Congress had enacted shortly after Franklin D.
Roosevelt (FDR) led the Democratic Party to a landslide victory in
November 1932.4 These statutes addressed the Great Depression by
taking over areas formerly reserved to the states – particularly
productive activities like labor, manufacturing, and agriculture.5
Congress asserted unprecedented authority under Article I of the

*James

Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. Thanks to my
fellow symposium participants for their insightful comments on this paper.
1 The definitive study is ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998).
2 See id. at 130-36, 223-360, 416-25, 434-35, 451.
3 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10-11, 14-15, 19-31,
34-36, 40-52, 58-59, 62-180 (1921).
4 See KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 491-565.
5 See WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 19321940, 1-166 (1963) (describing the revolutionary New Deal program).
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Constitution to (1) “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States;6
(2) tax and spend “for the General Welfare;”7 and (3) delegate its
“legislative power” to the executive branch.8
Constitutional challenges to the New Deal in the Supreme
Court initially succeeded.9 Justice Cardozo joined some, but not all,
of these decisions. He evaluated each statute by paying close attention
to the economic and social realities faced by Congress, the facts of the
case, precedent, and the need to maintain our constitutional system of
government.10 That last item proved to be especially tricky because
the Constitution does not precisely delineate the extent of each
branch’s powers, the degree of their separation, or the scope of the
federal government’s authority vis-a-vis the states.11
Indeed, Justice Cardozo wrestled with a conundrum that
inheres in the Constitution. On the one hand, it creates a democracy in
which legislative acts signed by the President are presumptively
valid.12 On the other hand, the Constitution limits the federal
government in two key ways. First, separation of powers prevents
Congress from assigning its core “legislative power” – to make and
amend laws – to the executive department.13 Second, the Tenth
Amendment embodies a federalism principle that precludes construing
federal powers in a manner that would effectively make them
unbounded and thereby displace the states’ reserved jurisdiction over
local matters.14
Justice Cardozo resolved this dilemma pragmatically by
deferring to Congress’s broad yet reasonable exercise of power, but
6

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
9 See infra notes 19-29, 36-41, 50-61 and accompanying text.
10 See infra Part I (citing many of Cardozo’s opinions illustrating this multifaceted method
of adjudication).
11 See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440-44 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting).
12 See KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 367, 389, 429, 435, 451, 571-76.
13 See infra notes 50-61, 89 and accompanying text (citing the Court’s repeated recognition
of this “nondelegation” doctrine). For an examination of the historical development of the
concept of “legislative power,” see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal
Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 746, 808, 823, 829-31 (2001);
see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 412-19 (1996) (elaborating upon the fundamental
constitutional distinction between “legislative” and “executive” power).
14 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., concurring).
7
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striking down hastily drafted laws that either gave Congress
unrestricted authority or the President total discretion.15 I will analyze
Cardozo’s major opinions to illustrate his balanced approach, which
the majority of his colleagues eventually adopted in 1937. I will then
explain why, shortly after Cardozo died in 1938, the Court abandoned
his effort to impose even minimal legal constraints on the federal
government.
I.

CARDOZO’S CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS

By coincidence, Cardozo became a Justice right before the
explosion of New Deal legislation in 1933 triggered epochal
constitutional controversies.16 At FDR’s urging, Congress invoked
the Commerce and General Welfare Clauses to justify its sweeping
economic and social reforms and also delegated massive “legislative
power” to administrative agencies.17
When such laws were
challenged, the Court invalidated them in 1935 and 1936, but finally
caved in after President Roosevelt and his Democratic comrades in
Congress had been decisively reelected.18
A. Regulating Interstate Commerce
Initially, the Court rigorously applied its longstanding
precedent that Congress could regulate only “commerce” (i.e., the sale
and transportation of goods, but not their production) that either moved
across state lines or had a “direct” effect on interstate commerce.19 For
example, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States20 concerned
15

See David N. Atkinson, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the New Deal: An Appraisal, 15 VILL.
L. REV. 68, 69-70, 82 (1969). I will provide concrete examples in Part I.
16 See WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1996).
17 See infra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
18 See infra Part I, Sections A, B, and C.
19 See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying
First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over
Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 68-77 (1999) [hereinafter Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking]
(summarizing and analyzing this precedent). In defining “commerce” to include only trade,
the Court ignored this word’s broader historical meaning: the sale of goods and services
(including paid employment, banking, and insurance) and all related activities intended for the
marketplace (such as commercial agriculture and manufacturing). See id. at 6-21, 35-42, 5079, 107-10; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation
of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2002).
20 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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a New Deal centerpiece, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
which authorized the President to enact “codes of fair competition” for
every American industry and trade.21 The resulting regulations
reached not only anticompetitive activities but also matters like wages,
hours, and public health.22 The federal government enforced one such
code, governing the poultry business, against a small company that
operated wholly within a state.23 The Court struck down this code on
the ground that Congress could not use the Commerce Clause to get at
noncommercial activities (like labor relations) that were local and that
had merely an “indirect” impact on interstate commerce.24 Justice
Cardozo concurred separately to stress that, although he was generally
willing to defer to Congress’s discretionary judgments about interstate
commerce, upholding this specific statutory provision as applied to a
tiny intrastate chicken seller “would obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local.”25
The Court reached a similar result in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.,26 which involved a federal law that fixed prices on coal sales
occurring in (or affecting) interstate commerce and that addressed
labor relations between coal miners and their employers.27 A majority
of Justices ruled that Congress lacked power to regulate coal mining
because this activity constituted production rather than “commerce”
and exerted only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce. 28 In
dissent, Justice Cardozo maintained that (1) the sale of coal was
“commerce,” so Congress could regulate it by setting prices; (2) the
transactions at issue either crossed state lines or directly and intimately
affected interstate commerce; and (3) passing on the constitutional
validity of the labor provisions was premature because they had not yet
been enforced.29
In the first Commerce Clause case after FDR’s reelection,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,30 Justice Cardozo’s
21

Id. at 521-27 (citing statute).
Id.
23 Id. at 519-21, 542-43.
24 Id. at 542-50.
25 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
26 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
27 Id. at 278-84 (citing statute).
28 Id. at 297-310.
29 Id. at 324-39 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
30 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
22

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/20

4

Pushaw: Constitutionality of the New Deal

2018

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW DEAL

339

conception of robust yet limited federal power triumphed when he and
four colleagues sustained the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).31
In the majority’s view, Congress had rationally concluded that it was
necessary and proper to regulate certain noncommercial, intrastate
activities (i.e., labor-management relations) because they had a “close”
and “substantial” relation to interstate commerce.32 The Court
emphasized the steel company’s large-scale national scope and
suggested that, conversely, Congress would not be permitted to
interfere with “local” activities that had merely an “indirect and
remote” effect on interstate commerce.33 Therefore, Jones & Laughlin
can be characterized as a reasonable, albeit significant, extension of
precedent allowing federal regulation of intrastate conduct that directly
and substantially affected interstate commerce.34
In short, the Court’s initial resistance to expansive Commerce
Clause legislation had given way in 1937 to a deferential, but still
meaningful, standard of review. The same pattern can be discerned as
to Congress’s power to tax and spend “for the . . . general Welfare.”35
B. Taxing and Spending
The Court’s approach dramatically shifted within the space of
a single year. In 1936, the Court in Butler v. United States36 invalidated
a provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) that taxed
processors of agricultural goods, with the revenue raised given to
farmers who decreased their crop acreage – and thereby helped reverse
a steep decline in prices.37 This result reflected three rationales.38
First, Congress could not take money from one private group of
31

Id. at 34-43.
Id. at 37, 40-43.
33 Id. at 26-28, 41-43.
34 See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3-7, 11-43, 139-225 (1998); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of
Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1203-04
(2003).
35 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
36 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
37 Id. at 53-57 (citing statute).
38 Interestingly, the Court began by rejecting James Madison’s narrow interpretation of
“general welfare” as encompassing only the other matters enumerated in Section 8 of Article
I (e.g., borrowing money and regulating interstate commerce), and instead endorsed Alexander
Hamilton’s position that the General Welfare Clause was an independent grant that included
any subject of national interest. Id. at 65-67, 77. Nonetheless, the Court ultimately found the
agricultural tax unconstitutional even under Hamilton’s broader view. Id. at 62-78.
32
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citizens and hand it to another.39 Second, the federal government could
not regulate agriculture because it was a “local” subject that the Tenth
Amendment entrusted exclusively to the states, and thus not a matter
of “general” (i.e., national) welfare.40 Third, Congress could not
exercise its taxing and spending power coercively by bribing states or
farmers to comply with its program.41 Justice Cardozo joined Justice
Stone’s dissent, which argued that Congress had plenary authority in
this area and could offer to pay citizens (here, farmers) if they
voluntarily agreed to comply with reasonable federal conditions (such
as reducing their crop acreage).42
The next year, the Court did an about-face in Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis,43 which concerned two Social Security Act (SSA)
provisions. One levied a federal unemployment tax on employers, but
credited them for taxes they had already deposited into a state
unemployment fund that met federal standards.44 The other SSA
provision subsidized states’ administration of their unemployment
funds.45 In his majority opinion, Justice Cardozo sustained these SSA
provisions as promoting “the general welfare” because unemployment
was a nationwide problem that the states could not resolve on their
own.46 He concluded that Congress had offered states the tax credit to
voluntarily “induce” – rather than “coerce” – them to create and
operate unemployment compensation systems that complied with
federal conditions.47 Justice Cardozo conceded that the difference
between “inducement” and “coercion” might not always be clear, but
maintained that this distinction could be worked out on a case-by-case
basis.48
39

Id. at 58-61, 70, 75-76.
Butler, 297 U.S. at 61-70.
41 Id. at 70-78.
42 Id. at 79-88.
43 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
44 Id. at 574-76 (citing statute).
45 Id. at 577-78.
46 Id. at 585-98.
47 Id. at 585-91.
48 Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 591; but see id. at 616-18 (Butler, J., dissenting)
(claiming that this distinction was illusory because any state with an unemployment
compensation system would have no real choice but to accept Congress’s money and attached
conditions, because state officials who declined to do so would be in the untenable political
position of having to raise their constituents’ state taxes to obtain the same benefit). In a
companion case, Justice Cardozo wrote for the majority in approving the SSA employment
tax provisions that funded retirement benefits. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 639-46
(1937).
40
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In sum, the Court in 1937 adopted Justice Cardozo’s position
that Congress’s power to tax and spend for the general welfare was
comprehensive, but still subject to the limit that states could not be
“coerced.” He took a similar view of the nondelegation doctrine.
C. Delegating “Legislative Power”
New Deal laws enacted under the Commerce and General
Welfare Clauses featured wholesale assignments of Congress’s
“legislative” (i.e., rulemaking) power to executive agencies.49 In 1935,
the Court struck down two such delegations and expressed extreme
skepticism about the constitutionality of this practice in general,
whereas Justice Cardozo endorsed delegations as long as Congress
made the fundamental policy choices and genuinely cabined executive
discretion.
The critical decision was Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,50
which involved a provision of the NIRA empowering the President to
ban the interstate shipment of “hot oil” – petroleum that exceeded a
state’s production quota.51 The Court held that Congress had violated
the separation of powers by delegating its legislative power to the
President without clearly articulating its policies and providing a legal
standard to restrict his exercise of discretion.52
In a lone dissent, Justice Cardozo contended that the NIRA,
read in its entirety, did set forth the required policy judgment and
limiting standard.53 He emphasized that the specific provision at issue
confined the President to a particular action (prohibiting the interstate
movement of “hot oil”) rather than giving him carte blanche over
either the petroleum industry or interstate transportation.54 Moreover,
other parts of the statute furnished concrete legal criteria by requiring
the President to determine that banning “hot oil” would further
Congress’s express goals: eliminating obstacles to interstate
commerce, ending unfair trade practices, stabilizing prices, lowering
unemployment, and encouraging the best use of natural resources.55

49
50
51
52
53
54
55

See infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Id. at 406, 418.
Id. at 414-30.
Id. at 434 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
Id. at 434-35.
Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 435-39.
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Therefore, Justice Cardozo found that Congress had appropriately
circumscribed the President’s discretion.56 Finally, he urged the
Justices to show greater deference by adopting a flexible view of
separation of powers that would give the political branches more
leeway to address pressing problems.57 Yet even Justice Cardozo
reached his breaking point in Schechter,58 which (as previously
discussed) concerned a law authorizing the President to promulgate
industrial “fair competition” codes.59 The Court invalidated this statute
because Congress had both exceeded its Commerce Clause power and
failed to lay down any legal principles to contain the President’s
discretion in determining “fair competition.”60 Justice Cardozo
concurred and argued that, in contrast to the situation in Panama
Refining, this statutory provision granted “a roving commission to
inquire into evils and upon discovery correct them. . . . This is
delegation running riot.”61
As usual, then, Justice Cardozo adopted a careful, common law
approach. He saw that the rapidly expanding administrative state
required broad delegations to expert agencies, but insisted that
Congress must make core policy decisions and formulate legal
standards that restricted executive discretion. Nonetheless, even
Cardozo’s modest efforts at controlling legislative delegations – and
his parallel attempts to impose certain outer limits on the Commerce
and General Welfare Clauses – did not take root.
II.

THE COLLAPSE OF CARDOZO’S “BROAD YET BOUNDED”
VISION OF FEDERAL POWER

Justice Cardozo became gravely ill in late 1937 and died the
following July.62 Seven other Justices either passed away or retired
between 1937 and 1943.63 President Roosevelt remade the Court in
his own image, stacking it with his staunch New Deal allies in politics

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 440.
Id. at 440-48.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id. at 521-27 (citing statute).
Id. at 529-42.
Id. at 551-53.
See KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 566-67.
See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 16, at 154-56.
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and academia rather than with experienced judges.64 Unsurprisingly,
FDR’s Court swiftly ended serious judicial review and instead
allowed virtually unbridled federal power.65 This precedent became
entrenched, and stare decisis has made it impossible for the more
conservative Court over the past few decades to craft meaningful legal
limits.66
A. The Commerce Clause
The year after Justice Cardozo died, the Court abandoned its
longstanding, federalism-based doctrine (reaffirmed in Jones &
Laughlin) that Congress could not regulate local, intrastate activities
that only indirectly and remotely affected interstate commerce.67
Perhaps most importantly, in 1942, the Court in Wickard v. Filburn68
held that Congress could support the requisite finding of a “substantial
effect” on interstate commerce by nationally aggregating the activities
64 For instance, Hugo Black and James Byrnes were Senators; Frank Murphy was the
Attorney General and former Michigan governor; Stanley Reed was the Solicitor General and
had held various other executive posts; and Robert Jackson was the Attorney General and had
also served as Solicitor General and in the Treasury Department. William Douglas was the
Securities & Exchange Commissioner and had been a Yale Law professor. The other
academics were Harvard’s Felix Frankfurter and Iowa’s Wiley Rutledge (who had briefly been
a federal judge). See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 16, at 154-56, 180-212, 220.
65 See Tracey E. George & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., How is Constitutional Law Made?, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1280-81 (2002) (stressing that the new Justices did not hesitate to reject
prior constitutional decisions).
Opening the floodgates of federal regulatory legislation threatened to swamp federal
court dockets. The Court responded by creating a host of jurisdictional doctrines, such as
standing, to stem the tide. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in
Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes
Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1324-28 (2005); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article
III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 447, 450-57, 518-31 (1994). Such jurisdictional activism would have been
unnecessary (or at least less pronounced) if the Court had imposed meaningful legal
restrictions on congressional power.
66 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional
Common Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 524 n.24 (2008) (emphasizing that stare
decisis has special force as to New Deal-era cases approving the modern administrative and
social welfare state, because overruling them after so many years would result in legal,
political, and economic chaos).
67 See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 604-09 (1939) (permitting the NLRA’s extension
to small and local employers); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-24 (1941)
(upholding the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a nondescript lumber company
and dismissing the idea that the Tenth Amendment was an independent, judicially enforceable
limit on Congress’s power).
68 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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of any class of people.69 Hence, the AAA could be applied to all wheat
producers – even a poor Ohio farmer who had slightly exceeded his
federal acreage quota and had used this wheat noncommercially for
personal and home consumption.70 Of course, nearly any activity,
when added up across the country, will “substantially affect” interstate
commerce. Consequently, this new standard had no real legal force.71
Predictably, for many decades the Court rubber-stamped all challenged
laws enacted under the Commerce Clause, including those designed to
achieve social and moral objectives that had at best a tenuous
connection to interstate commerce.72
The Court under Chief Justices Rehnquist (1986-2005) and
Roberts (2005-present) has left this precedent intact and instead has
attempted to devise limits on new federal legislation, which have
proved to be almost worthless from a practical standpoint. Most
notably, in 1995 the five conservative Republican Justices announced
in Lopez that Congress could only reach activities that were
“commercial,” either of themselves or as “an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity.”73 Accordingly, the Court invalidated
as “noncommercial” a recently enacted federal statute that had banned
firearm possession near schools,74 and a few years later struck down a
law granting a federal cause of action to victims of gender-motivated
violence.75 These two statutes, however, basically duplicated state
laws and were symbolic – calculated to show that Congress cared about
violence against students and women.76
By contrast, in 2005 the Court upheld a longstanding and
important federal drug law that criminalized the noncommercial and

69

Id. at 127-29.
Id. at 118-29.
71 See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 82 (showing that the Justices
understood this fact and were effectively granting Congress free rein).
72 See id. at 83-88 (analyzing the relevant cases, which considered statutes covering matters
such as crime and civil rights); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional
Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 320, 327-29 (2005)
(pointing out that this federal legislation often did not seem to have much to do with interstate
commerce).
73 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). The Court repeated this quoted
language in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
74 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-68.
75 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-19.
76 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Obamacare and the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause: Identifying Historical Limits on Congress’s Powers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703, 173739 [hereinafter Pushaw, Obamacare].
70
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local growth, possession, and use of marijuana for medical purposes.77
Logically, it makes little sense to say that mere possession of one item
(a gun) is not “commerce,” but possession of another item (marijuana)
is.78 The most plausible inference is that the Court does not have the
will to apply its “noncommercial” standard to nullify any non-trivial,
established statute.79
Similarly, the Roberts Court has proposed a “limit” on the
Commerce Clause that will have negligible real-world impact. In
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,80 the Court
held that Congress could regulate only existing commercial “activity”
– and thus could not in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) compel citizens
to enter into a commercial market by buying a product (health
insurance) that they did not want.81 Yet the ACA represents the only
time that Congress has ever attempted to use the Commerce Clause to
force inactive people to purchase something, so National Federation
will likely be a “one shot” case.82 Moreover, National Federation did
not put a dent in Congress’s overall regulatory power. That is because
the Court later dubiously concluded that the insurance-purchase
mandate, which Congress had clearly enacted as a regulation of
interstate commerce, could also be construed as a “tax” on those who
failed to comply – and hence sustained under Congress’s plenary
power to tax.83
In short, the Court created the “substantial effects” and
“aggregation” standards to achieve the political goal of protecting the
New Deal, then applied them for 57 years in a way that resulted in
virtually absolute Commerce Clause power. Furthermore, the recent
“limits” concocted by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts will have
almost no practical consequences.

77

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5-33 (2005).
See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause CounterRevolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 881-82, 885, 894-96, 899, 909-10, 913-14 (2005).
79 See Pushaw, Obamacare, supra note 76, at 1737-38.
80 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
81 See id. at 2585-93 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing this Act); id. at 2644-50 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
82 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, The Likely Impact of National Federation
on Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 979-80, 990, 993-96 (2013).
83 See National Federation, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-2601 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2609, 2629
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
JJ.).
78
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B. Taxing and Spending for the “General Welfare”
Since 1937, the Court has upheld every federal tax law and has
never found any subject to be beyond the scope of the “general
welfare.”84 When Congress has exercised its power under the
Spending Clause to grant states money if they comply with federal
conditions, the Court has paid only lip service to Justice Cardozo’s
admonition that Congress may “induce” – but not “coerce” – states.85
Instead of implementing his proposal to flesh out this distinction caseby-case by categorizing each challenged statute as falling on one or the
other side of that line, the Court has sustained every such law as a mere
“inducement.”86 The lone exception is that Congress cannot threaten
to strip states of all of their funding as a prerequisite to receiving their
share of federal money.87 Beyond that extreme scenario, which has
occurred exactly once and will almost certainly never be repeated, the
Spending Power is all-embracing.88
Overall, Justice Cardozo favored expansive congressional
authority to tax and spend for the general welfare, but with certain
outer boundaries that would be clarified in common law fashion. The
Court quickly gave up on the latter task of developing enforceable legal
limits.

84

The Court long ago admitted that taxation was really a political question not amenable to
judicial review. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953); see also Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 604-08 (2004) (upholding a federal criminal law forbidding bribery of
state and local officials of entities that received federal funds, even as applied to a defendant
whose bribes were not linked to any specific funding); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Paradox of
the Obamacare Decision: How Can the Federal Government Have Limited Unlimited Power?,
65 FLA. L. REV. 1993, 2019-20, 2033-34, 2038 (2013) [hereinafter Pushaw, Paradox]
(discussing the Court’s longstanding supine deference).
85 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987); Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947).
86 In the leading case, the Court approved federal legislation that withheld five percent of a
state’s highway funding if it did not increase its minimum drinking age to 21, even though the
Twenty-first Amendment expressly gives states total control over alcoholic beverages. See
Dole, 483 U.S. at 206-12. The Court concluded that Congress had “encouraged” rather than
“coerced” states because five percent was a relatively small amount. See id. at 211-12.
87 The Court found “coercive” an ACA provision that compelled states to either expand
Medicaid to include millions of new poor recipients or forfeit all of their existing Medicaid
funding, which realistically forced states to comply because Medicaid consumed a whopping
twenty percent of their average budget and the total funding involved was $100 billion. See
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-08 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (citing statutory provision); id. at 2643, 265768, 2676-77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing on this point).
88 See Pushaw, Paradox, supra note 84, at 2038, 2042.
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C. Delegation
In theory, the Court still adheres to the rule that Congress
cannot delegate its “legislative power.”89 In practice, however, the
Roosevelt appointees permanently buried this doctrine. For instance,
in 1943, the Court found that Congress, by authorizing an executive
agency to grant licenses in “the public interest,” had articulated a
sufficiently clear legal standard to guide the agency’s determinations.90
By contrast, Justice Cardozo would likely have insisted that Congress
make a more detailed policy decision and set forth legal principles that
curbed the agency’s discretion.91
In any event, the nondelegation doctrine has not been invoked
to strike down a federal statute in 83 years, and its prospects for
resurrection appear to be nil.92 The Court’s blind deference has
severely undermined separation of powers. Most notably, Congress
can curry favor with voters by passing laws that declare popular goals
in vague terms (such as a desire to reduce global warming), but evade
political accountability by delegating difficult policy choices
(manifested in burdensome regulations) on unelected bureaucrats.93
This debilitation of our constitutional democracy is a heavy price to
pay for the one benefit of wholesale delegation – to use the expertise
of agencies to address specialized problems.
III.

CONCLUSION

After 1937, the Court abandoned Justice Cardozo’s attempt to
interpret the Commerce and General Welfare Clauses (and Congress’s
attendant delegations of “legislative power”) generously, but subject
to genuine legal limits. Although this abject judicial deference has
facilitated the development of the modern administrative and social

89 See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1988).
90
See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
91 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
92 See William Kelley, Justice Scalia and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2107, 2117-18 (2017).
93 See DAVID SCHOENBORD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
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welfare state, Americans have lost the unique advantage of federalism
and separation of powers.94

94 In the Constitution, “We the People” granted only enumerated powers to our
representatives in all three federal branches, but reserved most governmental power to the
states. This diffusion of power, complemented by several specific checks (such as
impeachment and the Presidential veto), was designed to promote individual liberty and the
rule of law. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine:
Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1185-87
(2002). The modern administrative state threatens such basic constitutional principles and
values.
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